The Other First World War: The Blood-Soaked Russian Fronts 1914–1922 by Douglas Boyd

Author:Douglas Boyd
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: The History Press
Published: 2014-07-24T00:00:00+00:00

South-western front when Brusilov took command. Contemporary map with anglicised place names (e.g. Pripyat marshes are labelled ‘Marshes of Pinsk’).

Always keen to exploit new technology, Brusilov ordered aerial reconnaissance not only of the enemy front lines, but also in depth to the rear, so that he could see where the opposing commanders were concentrating reserves, where they planned to retreat or make a stand and, especially, chart their artillery dispositions. The result was a series of accurately plotted maps of the enemy positions, enhanced by interrogation of deserters and prisoners. This done, he shared the maps with his four army commanders and delegated to them the choice of axes for their attacks, each hitting between 8 to 25 selected miles of front. This enabled General Shcherbachev, for example, to designate a small salient in the south of his line where the opposing troops were of Slav origin – and therefore believed likely to surrender rather than fight – and where the topography favoured the Russian attackers, giving good cover for their troop movements while affording a clear field of fire for their artillery.7

With his passion for detail, Brusilov ordered full-size mock-ups of the enemy positions to be constructed behind the lines, so that the assault troops could make repeated mock attacks until they knew their way around in them as well as in their own lines. It was impressed on them that they should press on to the second line of defence with minimum delay, and not linger in the front lines – which, once taken, were vulnerable to counter-attack and pre-set artillery barrage. In his words: ‘We have to consider that our opponent normally places his strongest defence in the second line, so that assault troops halting in the front line only serve to concentrate the enemy’s fire.’8

It would have been futile to try and conceal all these preparations from enemy reconnaissance over-flights, so Brusilov confused the photographs thus taken by what would later be called a deception operation. He had dummy batteries constructed to deceive enemy observers and concealed the real batteries until the day of the attack. Misleading radio traffic was also generated specifically for Austrian interception. False ‘deserters’ crossed the lines with misleading disinformation. Movement of reinforcements was similarly passed off as one body of men apparently relieving another, so that the enemy command had no suspicion of the massive troop movements which had previously given away preparations for a massed Russian attack.

A picture of what conditions were like on the south-western front at the time comes from a soldier’s graphic letter dated 30 March 19169 that was read out in Russian by military historian Professor Narskii at a 2004 symposium in Berlin:

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